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On the virtue of 'generosity'What is generosity, and what makes it a virtue? Is it universally accepted, or merely a feature of our modern western society? On this latter question we may have to admit defeat. In the face of scepticism and ethical pluralism few virtues, indeed little in ethics at all, can withstand a sustained attack. Instead we must simply state the principles we hold to be correct, and be content to leave them as unproven postulates. Chief amongst these is the statement "our actions should be ethically right". In examining virtue ethics, the second is the P1 of Rosalind Hursthouse: "an action is right iff it is what a virtuous agent would do in the circumstances"i. Justifying these statements, and trying to prove that generosity (or indeed any virtue) is a virtue at all, is a problem beyond the scope of this essay. Suffice to say, the justification problem is one no school of ethics has yet adequately solvedii. Instead I shall concentrate on the question of what generosity is in the context of virtue ethics. To do so, I shall follow the model of Audi as laid out by Stan van Hooft by breaking virtuous action down into six features:iii
Van Hooft adds a seventh feature - the agent's emotions - which I choose to examine along with motivations, and an eighth - the agent's preparedness to reflect - which I shall also cover briefly. Firstly, the scope, or range of applicability of the virtue. What acts does it cover? Typically generosity involves giving money or material gifts to others, but it can be more abstract. I can be generous with my time, or with my affections. I can even be a generous lover. It's not just about money, rather it is about "liberality of giving"iv. There is some overlap between generosity and virtues such as altruism, benevolence and in particular charity, but there are differences. Generosity is more scalable. One can be more or less generous simply by the amount one gives. Put another way, generosity is measured mainly in terms of "size", and by what you give. By comparison, charity can perhaps be better measured by "closeness", and by who you give to. Charity assumes some kind of need in the recipient. Generosity does not. One can be generous towards your children even if your lifestyles are more than comfortable. Charity can be from an obligation or a duty (as in the Islamic traditionv) whereas generosity cannot. If you give only through obligation, it is hardly "liberality of giving". Indeed, the further beyond duty one goes, the more generous one becomes. This very specifically puts generosity outside the scope of typical Kantian style ethics. Notice that, while one can be generous towards one's children, merely giving to your children is not necessarily generous. After all, in having a child you take on a duty to raise it. Merely fulfilling that duty does not make you generous no matter how much time and wealth it requires. However, taking on a duty may in itself be a generous act. Raising your own child may not be a generous act, but fostering another's could well be. In this case you are under no obligation to make the commitment, so the commitment is generous. Once the commitment is made though, it becomes an obligation, and you have a duty to meet it, and in doing so you cannot be considered generous. Making the commitment was generous. Fulfilling the commitment is a duty. The second feature of a virtuous act is the objectives and targets. Why be generous? What are you trying to achieve? Generosity is a selfless act. To give with an expectation of a return is not generosity - it is a purchase, or an investment. To buy a round of drinks is not generous if you expect to be bought drinks in returnvi. Even if you are expecting nothing more than reputation or popularity, you are still trading rather than giving. As previously stated, generosity cannot involve duty. It also does not assume any needs in the beneficiary. If the act cannot be to benefit oneself, need not be to benefit another, and is not from duty, it only leaves joy in the virtue itself ("virtuous activity gives pleasure to the lover of virtue"vii). In the context of virtue the agent must have sufficient knowledge of all pertinent aspects, and sufficient wisdom to apply it correctly. This understanding, or "phronesis", is the third feature to examine. Wisdom and understanding are important considerations, as without them one can be "generous to a fault". While it cannot really be a fault to be too virtuous, flawed wisdom and poor understanding can result in virtue incorrectly appliedviii. It is not generous to give money to a fraudster, nor to give so much one cannot feed or clothe oneself. Giving lavishly to a favourite child may result in a spoilt brat. In The Prince Machiavelli says that a ruler who tries to be generous by distributing his wealth amongst his subjects leaves himself less able to finance the running of the country, or to defend it against attackix. Poor understanding and flawed virtue can do more harm than good. But generosity requires a more fundamental kind of understanding. Just as a charitable agent must, in order to do good, understand the meaning and application of "good", so too must a generous agent understand "value"x. I might make a gift of an antique watch without knowing its true value, or perhaps not comprehending it. Compare to someone who, knowing full well its value, makes a gift of it anyway. If you do not understand the value of a sacrifice, it is not a sacrifice. If you don't understand value, you cannot be generous. This can be tied in with the idea of "size" as discussed by Stockerxi. In identical circumstances, giving away £100 is more generous than giving away £10. However, if the circumstances are not identical, it may not be so clear. For a rich man £100 may represent a single meal. Giving it away means little. For a poor man, £10 may represent a week's food. Giving it away represents a substantial sacrifice. For him the virtuous act is of greater size, and so he can be considered the more generous even though he gives away less. The fourth feature to examine is the agent's motives and emotions. Because "virtue" is an internal state, it cannot be faked. You may appear virtuous, but you won't be virtuous, unless you actually feel and believe it insidexii. Kantian deontology, by contrast, stresses duty over all, even to the point of implying that an agent who performs a virtuous act because they want to is somehow morally inferior than the one who performs the same act with duty their only thoughtxiii. There are appropriate and inappropriate emotions to feel while performing an ostensibly generous act. Joy is an obviously appropriate emotion (see above). Contempt or resentment are equally obviously inappropriate. To give money simply to show off your wealth and to gloat in others' poverty is hardly the action of a virtuous agent, regardless of how much is given. Trickier emotions are sorrow and regret. To feel these after the act, to regret doing a good deed, suggests flawed virtue (unless it is based on new information, such as realising you've been defrauded). However, regret before the act, that must be overcome, may actually heighten the virtue. Consider a charitable man who gives to a man with genuine need, but who is offensive and rude. He may regret that doing the right thing requires giving to such an ungrateful specimen. Consider also the honest man who returns a rogue's wallet, and may feel regret for similar reasonsxiv. However, in the case of generosity there can never be this sense of sorrowful obligation because, as discussed above, obligation precludes generosity. One might feel sorrow that you cannot be more generous (perhaps you cannot afford the pony your daughter so ardently desires) but it is inappropriate to feel sorrow about being generous. As with objectives, the joy of giving is the only appropriate emotion. There are appropriate and inappropriate motivations too. This ties in with objectives, as well as range of applicability. An act is not generous if you are expecting something in return, or doing it out of obligation. Virtuous acts require virtuous motives, which in the case of generosity can only be the desire to bring joy. In some cases, overcoming a disinclination can make the act more virtuous. Consider courage. The more dangerous a situation, and the more you are afraid, the harder it is to be courageous, and the more virtuous you become if you succeed. However, whereas to be courageous you must overcome fear, to be generous you must overcome greed. This implies that the harder it is to be generous, the greedier you are, and possessing more vice can hardly make one more virtuous. Of course, while cowardice may be a vice, fear may not be. Similarly, greed may be a vice, but in a material world an attachment to material things is quite rational. As fear in the face of danger is no disgrace, so too might avarice in the face of poverty not necessarily be a weakness of character. Different people will feel different emotions and motivations, and feel them in different strengths. They will also be differently inclined to act upon themxv. This link between motive and action, this inclination to act, is the fifth feature to consider. While an agent may have all the right motivations, they may yet be inadequately motivated. Alternatively they may have ulterior, less virtuous motives that in fact drive the action. People can be complex and multi-faceted, even to the point of having both virtuous and non-virtuous motives for the same act. I may be genuinely fond of the woman I lavish gifts upon, while harbouring distinctly ungentlemanly desires. If genuinely selfless motives drive my actions, I am genuinely generous. However, if it is my carnal desires driving me, then all the virtuous intent in the world will not make it a virtuous act. There is also the possibility of force-of-habit becoming the motivating force. An act may start off genuinely virtuous, but after many repetitions it becomes routine. The appropriate motives are there, but have ceased to be the reason for the action. Finally, the sixth consideration is the beneficiaries - those to whom the agent gives. This will commonly be a single person, but could be many people, or something more abstract. It could be someone emotionally "close" to me, or someone/something I have no connection with at all. There are direct and indirect beneficiaries. If I give my time helping to administer a charity, this directly benefits my fellow charity workers, and indirectly benefits those the charity helps. I could donate money to build a youth club, or a church, thus benefiting a whole community. I might bequeath an art collection, thus benefiting the populace at large. It could even benefit art itself. Van Hooft adds a last feature - the agent must be willing to look back on their generous act and reflect on what they have donexvi. Were they as generous as they intended? Was their understanding complete? Were their motives pure, and were they genuinely applied? This willingness to reflect, this acceptance of possible fault, ensures the agent's integrityxvii. In this same spirit, and with the acceptance of possible improvement, I reflect on what I have written and am content with what has been done. Bibliography
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