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Critically compare a deontological and a virtue ethics approach to the following dilemma:A mother living in a troubled neighbourhood has witnessed a serious assault on a neighbour. The police have called for witnesses and her first reaction is to tell them what she knows. However, on reflection she finds that she has good reason to believe that if she identifies the attackers, the police will not be able to protect her family from retaliation.
Both theories would begin by questioning whether this was a dilemma at all. Could the mother "slip between the horns", perhaps by being an anonymous witness? Let us suppose that no such alternatives exist. How would we resolve the dilemma? Deontologists deal in rules, so their first task is to look for rules that apply. Deontological rules tend to be duty-based, so "be a responsible citizen", "do not allow the guilty to go unpunished", or simply "report crimes" would all be plausible, but do they always apply? Deontology draws a distinction between "perfect" and "imperfect" dutiesi. A perfect duty is one that always applies, such as "do not lie". An imperfect duty is one that applies only in certain circumstances, such as "assist those in need", which only applies if you actually encounter someone in need. A rule such as "report crimes" is an imperfect duty, in that you are not expected to seek out crimes to report. However, if you encounter a crime, it is your duty to report it. Just because the duty is "imperfect" does not necessarily mean there are exceptions. Can there ever be? Absolutism - the most uncompromising form of deontology - maintains that there can never be exceptionsii. While one must take care to formulate moral rules carefully and accurately, once they are defined they are inviolable. This includes even seemingly minor rules such as "do not lie". If an angry mob asks you the location of an innocent man who you are hiding, you cannot lie to them, even to prevent his murder (or your own). A rule such as "report all crimes" is similarly final even if to do so risks the safety of your family. However, absolutism faces difficulty when rules conflict. It is reasonable to say you have a duty of care towards your family, so another rule could be "protect your dependants". However, if we accept this rule we now have two rules we must adhere to, and yet in the scenario as given, if we adhere to one we necessarily violate the other. Is the dilemma therefore irresolvable, or can we resolve the conflict? With absolutist deontology, we cannot. Fortunately there is a less uncompromising form. This "compromise" deontology accepts that there may be conflicts of rules, and attempts to create a set of "second-order" rules to prioritise themiii iv. In the angry mob scenario above, where there are two conflicting rules ("do not lie" and "protect the innocent") "do not lie" would be ranked less highly. Thus, lying is permissible if it is required in order to protect an innocent. However, the ranking of rules is a far from trivial task. How are we to know whether "report crimes" or "protect your dependants" ranks more highly? For instance, there is a school of thought that says we must strive to be more than just animalsv. We should not just act on instinct. Defending one's progeny is the most basic of instincts, and so not worthy of a rational human. To refuse to do my civic duty is to abandon rationality in favour of bestiality. Therefore "report crimes" ranks higher. This is a harsh interpretation though, and unsurprisingly there are those who disagree, saying that parenthood is the highest calling of human lifevi, and that therefore "protect your dependants" ranks higher. There is yet another premise that states that you cannot be justified in performing one immoral act in order to prevent one or more equally immoral acts. So if volunteering as a witness is an immoral act, it must not be done, even if it could prevent further attacks. . We can see from these examples that deontology can rapidly descend into a maelstrom of rules, second-order rules, principles and premises, some arguing for one side, some for the other. "Kantians are frequently found on both sides of all the most controversial moral issues"vii It is easy to conclude that finite rules will never adequately describe the infinite variety of possible scenarios in life. "moral situations are too complex; moral rules too general and simplistic"viii There is one last, more subtle version of deontology that we should briefly mention: one espoused by the stoicsix. It suggests "precepts", proverb-like maxims that are more like guidelines than rules. Their strength is their flexibility, their weakness their vagueness. It is assumed that some degree of practical wisdom will be required to apply them well. In fact, they are very like the so-called "v-rules" of virtue ethics. These virtue ethics "v-rules", rather than making statements ("do not lie") instead guide us to act virtuously ("be honest"). They have an inherent evaluative quality and flexibility that deontological rules lack. Applying these to the dilemma, do we fare any better? Firstly, consider the applicable virtues and vices, and hence the applicable v-rules. To step forward and volunteer as a witness would be honourable, and would exemplify the virtue of honesty. As there is a threat involved, it also courageous. To stay silent, by contrast, is cowardly and dishonest. Staying silent in the full knowledge that the perpetrators would be free to attack again could be considered callous, as if they do attack someone else this is an attack you have deliberately not prevented. Of course, as with deontology, there is another side. To protect your family exemplifies caring. To knowingly place your family in danger is foolhardy at best, or callous at worst. Virtue ethics is therefore also faced with a conflictx, but can we resolve it? Would two equally virtuous agents in these circumstances come to different but equally valid conclusions (indicating a truly irresolvable dilemma), or can one action be considered more virtuous than the other? While deontology tries to resolve rules conflicts with more rules, virtue ethics takes a different approach. We must examine the scenario closely and apply phronesis - practical moral wisdom - to determine the most important virtues. We must delve deeper. Consider the details. It is a troubled neighbourhood, so presumably these attacks are reasonably common. If the attackers go unpunished it is likely they will attack again, possibly attacking your family. To believe you are protecting your family by staying silent might be naïve, which while hardly a vice is certainly not practical wisdom. Of course, it may be equally naïve to believe your testimony will guarantee the attackers are punished. The legal system is strongly weighted in favour of the accused, and your testimony may be insufficient in a court of law. Even if they are found guilty, the punishment may be trivial, and leave them free to seek reprisals. To make an informed decision, you need an accurate appraisal of the probabilities. Consider also the bigger picture. Virtue ethics is as concerned with long-term effects as with the immediate act. It is concerned with human flourishing ("moral virtue is a form of human excellence"xi). While we must again be wary of naïvety, your courage could become an inspiration for the neighbourhood. Motives are an important consideration. While deontology draws no distinctions between the same action (or inaction) performed for different reasons, for virtue ethics it is crucial. If the thinking behind staying silent is "I'm not getting involved. It's not my problem", you are displaying cowardice and callousness but no virtues such as caring. Of course, to come forward in scant disregard to the danger to your family is callous, and to do so in the hope of glory and reputation is vain and self-centred. However, to come forward, knowing the danger, and in fear for your safety, may actually display courage far more than foolhardiness. It is an example of a situation where the harder it is to be virtuous, the more virtue you display if you succeed. It is precisely because you fear for your family that it is virtuous to come forward. While heroism is not required ("people who do not achieve heroism are not necessarily vicious"xii) we are seeking the most virtuous route out of the dilemma. We are tentatively coming to the conclusion that volunteering as a witness is the more virtuous act. Certainly there are conflicting virtues, but with a bit of applied wisdom we can weigh them up and come to a conclusion. It would appear then that virtue ethics has been more successful than deontology. However, we have reckoned without Kant. Kant put forward what is known as the "categorical imperative". It comes in various forms, but in essence it states "act in a way you would wish everyone else to act"xiii. Can we apply it to this case? There is no indication that the mother supports the criminals, so we can be sure she would want them to be called to account. However, if she doesn't step forward herself, she is clearly hoping someone else does. She is acting differently to the way she would wish everyone else to act. More generally, if the mother failed to come forward, the criminals would go free. If other witnesses to other assaults behaved this way, then no-one would ever face justice. The already troubled neighbourhood would get more and more violent as the criminal element began behaving with ever greater impunity. This is clearly an undesirable outcome, but would be inevitable should everyone remain silent. Therefore, to remain silent would not be in accordance with the categorical imperative. So, we have quickly come to a conclusion that simple rules deontology was struggling to manage. It is also somewhat more decisive than the vagueness of virtue ethics. Does this mean Kantian deontology is the better approach? Kantian deontology's advantage is its preciseness. One can in theory begin from a premise, and through a number of logical steps arrive at a conclusion. However, in practice this is exceedingly hard to achieve, with conflicts frequently arising. Virtue ethics is perhaps vague, but this vagueness protects it from conflict. Deontology aims to be universal, independent of circumstances ("Basic moral judgements are universal in form. They contain no essential reference to particular persons or particular relationships in which the agent may stand."xiv) but is this plausible? In Britain the attackers may be twelve year old boys, but in Rwanda they may be soldiers with guns. It's hard to believe the same rules could hold true in both. However, virtues adapt to the circumstances. The v-rule "be courageous" can always be valid, even while what constitutes "being courageous" varies. Deontology is impartial. Personal relationships are irrelevant unless they contain an element of duty ("there is no such thing as a morality of care"xv). While perhaps ideal for formulating legal systems, this attitude helps little when trying to persuade a terrified mother to do the right thing. Virtue ethics can start from a consideration of care, assure her she can be a good mother while still courageously doing what's right ("Care and responsibility within personal relationships constitute an important element of morality itself"xvi). In hypothetical scenarios where deontology can establish a clear answer, it is the more powerful approach, especially when dealing with lawyers and philosophers. However, deontology is cold, inflexible, and quickly finds itself swamped in conflict. In real world scenarios, especially ones involving real people, virtue ethics could yet prove to be the more useful approach. Bibliography
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