Apply the virtue ethical approach to the following claim:
It is always wrong to steal.

Would a virtuous agent ever steal? The immediate answer would seem to be "no", but why? What virtue is it counter to? What vice does it exemplify? Stealing a treasured heirloom would certainly be callous, and robbing a bank to feed your dreams of an extravagant lifestyle would be greedy. However, stealing comes in many forms, from burglary and mugging to shoplifting and so-called "copyright theft". Stealing a loaf of bread from Sainsbury's to feed your starving children seems neither callous nor greedy, yet it is still stealing. The fact that you take such a risk may even be considered caring, and thus virtuous. So is it wrong?

The problem is perhaps that to understand stealing we must first discuss rights. "We would still need the language of rights even with a fully developed language of the virtues"ⁱ. Theft implies ownership, which assumes property rights, but rights and virtues are not the same. Righteous does not mean virtuous. Exercising one's rights can be vicious, as when huge corporations sue schoolchildren for thousands of dollars simply for downloading an MP3, or when a husband forcibly exercises his conjugal rights on his unwilling wifeⁱⁱ. Rights themselves can be intrinsically vicious, as with jus primae noctis (the semi-mythical right of a lord to bed the newly wedded wife of any of his vassalsⁱⁱⁱ) or slavery, which is after all a form of property.

So if a virtuous agent does not steal, it cannot simply be because it violates a right. However, without assuming the concept of rights it is very hard to justify the concept of property. Without property there can be no theft. Compare to Hill's discussion where he attempts to demonstrate to a determined sceptic why they should respect the environment^iv.

However, virtue ethics is nothing if not flexible. While deontology might talk of inviolate duties with regards to rights, virtue ethics is more likely to talk of respecting rights while always applying phronesis - practical wisdom. Property may or may not be a fundamental right but one could argue that it is a vital part of eudaimonia - human flourishing^v. "A virtue is a character trait a human being needs to flourish or live well"^vi. To live well in a modern capitalist society certainly requires an acceptance of property. Living well, being a good person and earning an honest living is contrary to being a good thief^vii.

Of course, humans can flourish without property. One could become a monk, or join a commune, but these involve voluntarily surrendering property rights and stepping outside of society. Note however that even within a commune where everything is shared, and theft is meaningless, an outsider can still steal from the community. A commune would be unable to flourish if outsiders kept stealing vital farm equipment.

Let us assume that property is necessary for human flourishing, and that there is a virtue that promotes it. Justice is generally taken to be the virtue associated with rights and laws^viii ("Justice has to do with what men owe each other"^ix) although I personally believe it to be too general. Instead I think the virtue of respecting-another's-property is an unnamed virtue, rather like the negative of covetousness^x. In practice though it's a minor detail as long as we accept that an appropriate virtue exists.

Having established (or rather assumed) that it is virtuous to honour another's property, we can return to the question: Is it always wrong to steal? Let us examine in detail some aspects of stealing.

Consider the relative value of the stolen property - the "size" if you will^xi - both to the victim and the thief. It may be that stealing the life savings of a trusting old lady is more vicious than stealing a loaf of bread from Sainsbury's, but that doesn't automatically justify the latter. Even though the loss of a single loaf would be unnoticeable to a large supermarket, it is still not something a virtuous agent would do. A virtuous agent is honest, and would therefore pay for the loaf, even if he knew that no-one would be appreciably worse off for his stealing it.

This applies even if what is being stolen is of zero value to the victim, as in the case of "copyright theft". Here the thief is not actually taking anything real from the copyright owner. Rather they are taking a potential sale. Every copy the thief takes and sells is money going to him rather than to the copyright owner, but it is not money that the copyright owner ever actually possessed. Their actual loss is zero. However, this is still not something a virtuous agent would do. Somewhere, someone has worked hard to produce what the thief has copied, and honest work deserves honest reward. "Injustice may be involved in an act or an omission"^xii. Just as an honest agent would not steal, so too would he not omit to pay.

So we can conclude that if the value of what is stolen is the only criteria, stealing is always wrong. Similarly we can see that if items of identical value are stolen from various different victims, it will still always be wrong, even if to one person the item represents a vastly larger percentage of their property than to another. However, that is not to say the victim is irrelevant.

As mentioned above, having a right does not make you virtuous. What if you steal from a vicious person? In particular, what if you steal something that they should not possess?

One can have a legitimate right to something that you do not deserve, or that does you harm. "There is ... no direct connection between that to which a man has a right and that which is for his good"^xiii. A wayward son can inherit vast wealth. A smoker can buy cigarettes. If the ownership is legitimate, then no matter how much the agent wishes to do what seems to be right, the ownership must be respected. "Rights must be honoured even though honouring them does not accomplish any particular good"^xiv. However, it is different if the ownership is not legitimate.

Consider the tale of Robin Hood - robbing the rich to give to the poor. The understanding is that the rich are undeserving and probably obtained their wealth through vicious oppression of the honest and hard-working poor. He was not stealing for personal gain, but to relieve suffering and injustice. He risked the wrath of the authorities who would kill him if they could. He displays courage and compassion. Does this justify stealing?

Compare it to the case of finding a wallet full of cash. Even if the owner turned out to be an irredeemable cad, the truly virtuous person would still be honest and return it, albeit with sorrow. Certainly they would not keep the wallet for themselves, but nor would they give it to the needy. It is an example of how the harder it is to be virtuous, the more virtuous you become if you succeed^xv.

This is perhaps not a fair comparison though. What if the wallet found belonged to a thief and contained cash that had been stolen? In this case one could argue that the wallet-owner had an invalid claim over the cash, and so even a virtuous agent is under no obligation to respect it. The virtuous thing to do would be to return the empty wallet to the thief, and return the cash to its original owner.

While there may be a slight difference between "active" and "passive" stealing, this is a closer comparison to Robin Hood, and it highlights the fact that for his actions to be virtuous, the rich must have acquired their wealth illegitimately from the poor. Simply stealing from the rich because they are rich cannot be virtuous no matter how ill-deserving they are.

There are cases where ownership may be legitimate, but morally questionable in some other way. Slavery is a prime example. Cruelly treated captive animals is another. In such cases it would seem clear that if the possessing is vicious, then stealing (i.e. freeing the slave/animal) is virtuous. This may be so, but one must be especially careful to apply phronesis in these cases. Freeing captive animals may seem virtuous, but would they survive outside of captivity? Before resorting to illegal acts, one must be sure that all possible legal recourse has been exhausted. Even then, one must be extremely sure of your moral foundations. It may seem virtuous to free the lab rats from certain death, but the experiments being performed on them could directly benefit the whole of humanity.

However, there are relatively clear-cut cases where legitimate ownership rights must be ignored for the greater good^xvi. It is conceivable that a well-funded terrorist cell could legitimately purchase a nuclear weapon from a disreputable source. They have every intention of using it to destroy a major city. Taking the weapon off them would scupper their plans utterly. This would be stealing, but a virtuous agent would not be applying practical wisdom if he let that technicality prevent him saving a city.

This leads us to consider the motive for stealing. To steal a nuclear weapon from terrorists to save a city is virtuous, especially if done at considerable risk to oneself. However, if you instead intend to sell the weapon on to the highest bidder (perhaps to a different terrorist cell) you begin to look far less virtuous. Robbing the rich to give to the poor may be noble, but keeping the riches for yourself is not. Stealing a loaf of bread from Sainsbury's simply to save a few pence is dishonest, but if you do not have a few pence and you need to feed your starving children, then the dishonesty of stealing is outweighed by the callousness of letting your children starve.

Note that in this latter case value becomes important, as it directly reflects on motive and emotion. If I am destitute, and have to steal to feed my children, it becomes important whether I steal a loaf from Sainsbury's, or the entire larder from my elderly neighbour. If stealing really is the only option, a virtuous agent would do it sorrowfully, and would do all they can to ensure it was done with the minimum adverse impact. They would not take it as an excuse for armed robbery.

Motive is also important when resolving the few cases where virtues conflict. In the case of stealing, this normally involves courage. To risk life, limb and the wrath of the authorities requires courage. The more daring the heist, the more courage is required. However, the requiring of courage does not make it a virtuous act. If your motives are vicious, such as greed, or trivial, such as thrill-seeking, then courage is no justification. However, if your motive is the greater good, as in the example of stealing weapons from terrorists, then courage can genuinely be considered a virtue.

There is one more motive that deserves mention - kleptomania. In this case, there is no motive at all. One steals because one is driven to do so by mental illness. While it can hardly be considered virtuous to be mad, being mad does not stop you being otherwise virtuous. You can still be "characteristically" virtuous.^xvii (Although compare to the idea of "moral luck"^xviii). However, in practice this is identical to the case of the destitute parent. In both cases the agent steals because they must. And so, a virtuous agent, suffering under the compulsions of kleptomania, would steal with sorrow and regret, and would attempt as best they could to steal in such a way as to minimise the suffering for others.

So, after applying a virtue ethical approach, we can conclude that there are cases where even a fully virtuous agent would steal if it was unavoidable, or was for the greater good. Therefore, stealing is not always wrong.

Bibliography

1. Robert Soloman Corporate Roles, Personal Virtues p212 ; in Daniel Statman Virtue Ethics a Critical Reader 1997 ; Edinburgh University Press
2. James Bogen Suicide and Virtue p20 ; in Applying Virtue Ethics - Offprints Collection 2000 ; Open University
3. http://www.petalk.com/humanist/jpn.html
4. Thomas E. Hill Ideals of Human Excellence ; in Applying Virtue Ethics - Offprints Collection 2000 ; Open University
5. Rosalind Hursthouse 2000 Applying Virtue Ethics pp96-97 ; Open University
6. Rosalind Hursthouse Virtue Theory and Abortion p229 ; in Daniel Statman Virtue Ethics a Critical Reader 1997 ; Edinburgh University Press
7. Gary Watson On the Primacy of Character p67 ; in Daniel Statman Virtue Ethics a Critical Reader 1997 ; Edinburgh University Press
8. Rosalind Hursthouse 2000 Applying Virtue Ethics pp94-95 ; Open University
9. Philippa Foot Euthanasia p36 ; in Applying Virtue Ethics - Offprints Collection 2000 ; Open University
10. Rosalind Hursthouse 2000 Applying Virtue Ethics pp92-94, also p49 ; Open University
11. Michael Stocker Emotional Identification, Closeness and Size pp125-126 ; in Daniel Statman Virtue Ethics a Critical Reader 1997 ; Edinburgh University Press
12. Philippa Foot, as above.
13. Ibid p38.
14. James Bogen, p21, as above
15. Rosalind Hursthouse Virtue Ethics and the Emotions p101 ; in Daniel Statman Virtue Ethics a Critical Reader 1997 ; Edinburgh University Press
16. Philippa Foot, p39, as above.
17. Rosalind Hursthouse 2000 Applying Virtue Ethics p33 ; Open University
18. Daniel Statman Virtue Ethics a Critical Reader 1997, p14 ; Edinburgh University Press