In what ways, if any, is taxation like forced labour?
What is the upshot of your answer for an account of distributive justice?

The claim that taxation of earnings is like forced labour was notably made by Robert Nozick (Nozick 1974). In part 1 of this essay I shall assess this comparison and examine the premises it relies on. In particular I shall be asking whether we have full and inviolable property rights over our earnings, or whether there is a sense in which submitting to taxation is voluntary or obligatory. I shall conclude that taxation is a violation of our property rights, and is thus like forced labour in the way that Nozick describes. In part 2 I shall examine the ramifications of this conclusion for theories of distributive justice. I hope to show that, provided we do not insist on self-ownership as an absolute right, they are not significant.

For the purposes of this essay, "taxation" refers only to tax on the earnings of labour, which need not necessarily be monetary. "Obligation" refers to moral obligations, other kinds of obligation being referred to as a "commitments".

How is taxation like forced labour?

Nozick's claim runs as follows. If 20% of my earnings are taken in tax, then for every five days I work, a day's earnings are taken from me. This is equivalent to working four days with pay and then working a fifth day without pay. I cannot choose not to pay my taxes, so I cannot choose not to work the unpaid day. Thus I am forced to work without pay, which is forced labour (Nozick 1974, p6).

As far as it goes, this comparison is reasonable. Taxation is like forced labour in that we are being forced to work, and then our earnings are being taken from us. However, it relies on the assumption that I have the right to labour as I choose and the exclusive right to the earnings of that labour, and that taxation violates those rights. If taxation is voluntary, or morally obligatory, then it is not a violation of our rights, nor can it be if in fact we do not possess those rights.

Let's first examine whether taxation is truly forced. Income tax is normally only levied once earnings exceed a certain threshold. One could simply choose not to earn above this threshold, thus making the tax, in effect, voluntary. Nozick argues that for the state to take a proportion of our earnings is a fundamental transgression of our rights no matter how much we earn. Forced labour is still forced labour, no matter how many days of unforced labour have gone before (Nozick 1974, p6).

Michael Otsuka counters this. He contrasts a thug ordering you to be his slave for a day on pain of death with the same thug ordering you to be his slave but only if you first choose to do something you had no particular intention of doing. In the first case you are being forced into slavery, in the second case you are not (Otsuka 1998, p7).

Otsuka's contrast is flawed however. Labouring to improve ones quality of life is something many (perhaps most) people actively wish to do. A better second case would be: the thug sees you, surfboard and wetsuit in hand, advancing enthusiastically towards the beach and orders you to be his slave for a day - on pain of death - if you choose to go surfing. If your desire to surf is sufficient you may consent to the thug's terms, but this is no different from consenting to be his slave because your desire to live is sufficient. Either way the thug forces you into slavery.

Thus, taxation is like forced labour in that it is non-voluntary. However, maybe taxation is a moral obligation. Being forced to adhere to your obligations is merely the implementation of justice, and thus is not like forced labour.

In these modern times we tend to believe that we do not necessarily have any obligation to obey the state, particularly if the state is unjust. Consider civil disobedience as a form of legitimate protest. If our relationship with the state was contractual our commitments and therefore our obligations would be clear. However, any such contract is at best implicit and/or undertaken under duress - e.g. on pain of exile (Gilbert 1999, pp3-6). Nozick claims that any non-contractual commitment to another entity surrenders partial control over your actions to them, and is therefore a form of slavery (Cohen 1995). G.A. Cohen counters by pointing out that there are non-contractual commitments that are clearly not a form of slavery, for example towards ones children (Cohen 1995, p2-4). However, he fails to specify how such commitments arise, and so we cannot know whether this applies to our relationship with the state. In the absence of a positive proof, we conclude that we have no obligations to the state.

So, taxation is like forced labour in that it is not an obligation. The state is taking our property, that we are not obliged to give it, without our consent. We shall now examine whether we genuinely have full property rights over our earnings.

The right over one's labour and earnings is derived from the Lockean thesis of self-ownership. If I have a property right in X, I have the right to use it as I wish. I also own any produce or income derived from X or its use. Thus if I have a property right in my own person, I have the right to use my body as I wish (e.g. to labour) and the right to the income derived from its use (Locke 1690, chV). For now I shall simply assume self-ownership, although it should be noted that the thesis can be criticised¹. Instead I shall examine the nature of ownership itself.

A property right encompasses a number of 'incidents'. Tony Honoré details eleven such incidents (Honoré 1987). These include rights to possess, use and control, but also conditions and liabilities such as a prohibition on harmful use. I might legitimately own a knife but my right to use it as I wish does not grant me the right to stab you. One could argue that not submitting to taxation violates this prohibition by causing harm to those who would benefit. In fact Honoré suggests (although does not insist) that the incidents of ownership might specifically include a liability to taxation (Honoré, p8-9). Thus it is the very fact of ownership that obligates me to pay tax.

However, whereas the Lockean account of property begins from a state of nature, Honoré's account presumes the existence of a legal framework. His initial definition of ownership is "the greatest possible interest in a thing which a mature system of law recognizes" (Honoré, p1). Many of Honoré's incidents - e.g. limits on usage or liability to insolvency - are not part of the definition of ownership at all, but aspects of a system created to maintain and enforce ownership (Christman 1991, p2). We cannot use an account that assumes a system to justify part of that system.

This criticism can be escaped if we separate out the aspects of ownership that are fundamental from those that assume an economy. If we can then show that, while Lockean self-ownership is fundamental, our rights over earnings are not, then we can rescue the idea that the obligation to pay tax is contained within our right to earn. This is a tactic adopted by John Christman.

Christman splits the incidents of property into two types: rights of control, and rights of income. These rights are qualitatively different, and are derived in different ways. Control rights are derived from the rights of the individual, and apply even in a state of nature. Income rights are derived from an economic frame of reference, and are meaningless without it (Christman, p3-4). Applying this to self-ownership we see a distinction between my right to labour - i.e. my right to control my person - and my right to the earnings of that labour. My right to earn is tied up in the economic system, and if this system includes the liability to taxation then - as per Honoré - the obligation to pay is contained within the very nature of earnings.

Unfortunately, Christman's tactic fails, as it can be shown that income rights cannot be separated from control rights.

Trade comes about from discrepancies between possessions and desires. I have more apples than I want, and desire more oranges than I have. Your position is the reverse, so we agree to trade apples for oranges. I have full control rights over my apples, which includes the right to transfer ownership to another individual, e.g. as a gift. Trade is no more than an exchange of gifts. The right to trade cannot be separated from the right to give, but the right to give is a control right. It is no different if instead of trading apples I trade my labour. Therefore my right to the earnings of my labour is derived from control rights, and is not dependent on an economic system.

The only avenue remaining to us is to question whether we have control rights over our earnings. Yet control rights are at the core of ownership. If I own X, but cannot use X, my ownership is worthless. Ownership of my earnings is directly derived from the self-ownership thesis. If I own myself I own my earnings, therefore if I do not own my earnings I do not own myself, and if I do not control my earnings I do not own them. Therefore we find that the only way to criticise Nozick's comparison is to abandon the thesis of self-ownership itself.

So, to conclude part one of this essay, I have shown that we have a fundamental property right over the earnings of our labour, and that payment of taxes is neither obligatory nor voluntary. Thus, Nozick's comparison holds, and taxation is significantly like forced labour. We shall now consider the ramifications of this conclusion.

The consequences for distributive justice

All systems of distributive justice require taxation of earnings. No matter what the pattern, it will require maintenance. Over time, some individuals will earn more than was anticipated, while others earn less. A mechanism needs to be in place to transfer resources from one individual to another in order to correct these fluctuations - i.e. taxation. If, as I have argued, taxation is significantly like forced labour, then any system of distributive justice involves the violation of our self-ownership rights. Distributive justice is unjust.

Can distributive justice be rescued? Fortunately it can, by arguing that taxation is a just infringement of our rights rather than an unjust violation. We need not abandon the thesis of self-ownership altogether. We need only accept that it is not absolute, and few rights are truly absolute. Even my right to life can be justifiably infringed if my death will prevent the deaths of others².

Taxation is a just infringement if and only if it prevents or rectifies a larger injustice. So we must show that the injustice of my forced labour is less than the injustice that taxation seeks to rectify. To do this we need some method for measuring injustice. Fortunately, because we are talking about property and resources, there are various methods available.

Measuring injustices using the absolute monetary value of resources redistributed won't work. If £100 is taken from me and given to another, this is a £100 injustice to rectify a £100 injustice. This is simply moving an injustice from one place to another. Measuring as a percentage of total resources is an improvement. If I earn £10,000 while another individual requires £100 to reach basic subsistence levels, then the same redistribution is a 1% injustice against me, but a 100% rectification of an injustice. We could also measure injustices in terms of welfare - a combination of resources, ability and opportunities. £100 in tax may have little impact on my welfare but radically transform someone else's.

These are crude illustrations, but hopefully demonstrate the point that a minor injustice against me - i.e. taxation - can alleviate a major injustice elsewhere. We can thus see that taxation can be a justifiable infringement of my right of self-ownership. Therefore, even though we have shown that taxation is like forced labour, we have also shown that this has no serious ramifications for systems of distributive justice.

Notes

1. Brian Barry for example claims that self-ownership is little more than a linguistic confusion, and that I cannot own myself or my labour any more than I can own my shadow (Barry 1996, countered in Cohen 1996).
2. This is not an uncontestable claim. For a brief discussion, see Otsuka 1998, section I. For a fuller discussion on absolute rights, see Gewirth 1982.

Bibliography

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