Discuss whether nationalism poses a problem for liberalism

Nationalism is - very broadly - the view that one's nation and one's compatriots are owed a special allegiance. Liberalism, by contrast, is based on the assumption that every individual is equal. At first glance it does appear that both views cannot be right. In this essay I shall explore this apparent conflict and examine whether nationalism poses a problem for liberalism. I hope to show that the values of nationalism can either be easily incorporated into a liberal state, or will be subordinate to it.

I shall begin by clarifying what is meant by nationalism. If nationalism is owing one's nation special allegiance, then let's start by exploring what constitutes a nation.

A nation is not simply a sovereign state or the population of a geographical area, as one can exist without any kind of fixed territory or political infrastructure. Miscevic gives the example of the Iroquois native-Americans (Miscevic 2005). Other examples include the Jewish people before the formation of modern Israel, or the Kurds in northern Iraq. A nation is not simply a population linked by language, history or culture. Between the western European nations there is substantial overlap of all these things. Yet it seems far fetched to claim that these factors are entirely irrelevant. Nationalist movements in places such as the Basque region often stress the uniqueness of their language and culture, and lay claim to territory (Miscevic 2005; Miller 1998, sect 1).

A nation is perhaps best thought of as a collective identity. It exists because there are individuals who feel they belong to it, and who identify themselves with it. In other words, a nation exists because there are those who feel a sense of nationalism towards it (Miller 1993, p305). The nation will be perceived, truthfully or otherwise, as having certain characteristics which all its nationals share. These will usually be ethnic and/or cultural in nature, commonly including one or more of territory, language, history and biological lineage amongst others. It is these shared characteristics that give rise to the sense of shared identity, and to nationalism, and hence to a nation. Without nationalism you would just have a group of individuals, mere citizens of a state at best1.

What distinguishes a nation from other communities is the capacity (or at least the believed capacity) to constitute a sovereign state. This is where potential conflict with liberalism arises, as they both have things to say about the correct way to run a country.

Now let us consider liberalism. At its core, it is a thesis of the individual and of autonomy. It states that every individual is equal and has certain unalienable rights. Versions of liberalism will differ in what rights they emphasise, but the right to lead ones own life in a manner of ones own choosing (subject to the condition that you do not violate any other individual's unalienable rights) is perhaps the most central.

We immediately see a potential conflict between liberalism and nationalism. The shared national characteristics may include some sort of lifestyle dictates, for example a national religion. In a nation that is catholic, its institutions are going to be strongly geared towards and influenced by catholic doctrine. An individual who wishes to lead their life contrary to catholic doctrine will have a hard time, and at the extreme could face arrest and imprisonment. This directly conflicts with the central liberal tenet that every individual should be free to live their life as they choose.

However, this only poses a problem for liberalism as a theory if it can be shown that the national attitude is correct, and that individual lifestyle choices should be repressed to conform to the nationalist ideal. Just as a theory of justice is not threatened by the fact that people exist who want to be unjust, so liberalism is not threatened by illiberal tendencies in the national character. While it initially seems clear that repression is never justified, the topic of liberal ethics vs national obligations is fairly key and deserves further discussion. Hence I shall return to it later.

Another crucial aspect to liberalism is freedom of choice. A right to X is meaningless if you cannot choose whether or not you actually want X. The right to vote necessarily contains within it the right to choose not to vote. Otherwise it is not a right, but an obligation. The right to abstain from national military service becomes a prohibition if you can't choose to sign up.

Corollary to this is that liberal theories make much use of the idea of consent. In particular, citizenship is regarded as a consensual social contract between the state and the individual. In effect, nationality is voluntary.

However, there is an inherent contradiction to the idea of a voluntary nation. For a group of individuals to come together and form a nation (as opposed to some other kind of grouping) there must be some pre-existing common bond (Scruton 1990, pp282-283). One cannot simply create a shared identity if none exists.

Also, how is it decided who gets to sign up to the social contract? What criteria should be applied if not nationality? This remains a problem once the state is formed, as children start being born to its citizens. Until they reach a suitable age of consent, are they to be regarded as not members of the state? This seems entirely counter-intuitive. It is more usual to maintain that the circumstances of ones birth and upbringing are the key factors in determining nationality, and these factors are in no way consensual (Miscevic 2005, sect 1.2).

It certainly appears that the incoherence of voluntary nationality presents a problem for liberalism, or at least for those versions that rely on the idea of the social contract. However, nationalism is a solution to, rather than a cause of, this problem. It is quite coherent to suggest that a pre-existing nation elects to form a liberal state on the basis of a social contract. Children are born into the nation and later choose to become citizens of the state, or not as the case may be.

This leads to another possible conflict. Just as nationality is not chosen, can we claim it can be opted out of?

If we are born into our nation, then it follows that we cannot change our nation. If "I was born English" was ever true for me, then it will always be true. However, unchangeable characteristics are not a problem for liberalism. My unchangeable nationality is of no more importance than my height. However, my height does not come laden with questions of duties and obligations, whereas my nationality does. The question we should be asking is whether these can be changed. The obligation to support ones nation is central to nationalism, but is this obligation unconditional? If our national duties oblige us to be illiberal this would be a significant problem for liberalism. Hence we return to the question of liberal ethics vs nationalist obligation.

Are you obliged to support your nation if you believe it is wrong? Must you go to war if you believe in peace? Must raise your children as Catholics if you are an atheist? Liberals categorically say that you are not obliged. You have the right to disagree with your nation, even to protest against it. Nationalists would disagree. In a difference of view such as this, we must attempt an impartial resolution.

It is coherent to judge a nation by impartial standards. The world, both present and past, is littered with nations responsible for blatantly immoral acts. Often this is simply the result of an immoral leader acting contrary to his nation's wishes, but sometimes the actions are in accordance with the national character of the time. From the holocaust of Nazi Germany, through the colonialism of the British Empire, to the slavery in the USA, we are not short of examples of a nation acting as one, and yet acting immorally.

Unless we subscribe to the strongest and most implausible form of the embeddedness thesis, it is coherent for a national to judge his own nation and find against it. Thus it is quite plausible to imagine a scenario where a national has to choose between his nationalist obligations and his ethics. For example, a slave trader discovers his conscience, but knows that without his shipment of fresh slaves his country's cotton industry would be crippled.

So the question becomes, are you obliged to support your nation if it means performing an act you know to be unethical? If you are, then those who carried out the Rwandan genocide, or who operated the Nazi death camps, need only show that it was the will of the nation to be entirely justified in their actions. This is nationalism at its most implausible.

These are extreme examples. However, they demonstrate that our nationalist obligations are not unconditional, but are subject to moral standards. These are the same moral standards that form the basis of liberalism. While nationalism is subject to ethics, liberalism is based on ethics. Therefore, in the event of any conflict of interests between nationalism and liberalism, it is nationalism that must give ground. Thus, nationalist obligations pose no problem for liberalism.

This leads us to another difference between nationalism and liberalism. Nationalism makes no claim to be based on any sort of universal ethical system. Instead it makes claims about what is valuable, such as solidarity, unity and the inherent value of the nation itself. Liberalism by contrast is entirely value neutral, taking the position that it is up to the individual to decide what is valuable for them. If we can find a value that nationalism advocates and that is vital to the human condition, but that liberalism ignores, then this will present a problem for liberalism.

Miller argues that nationalism is the only mechanism that will instil a sense of unity into a disparate and disperse population, and that without this unity the state would surely disintegrate into localised factions. Modern economic forces result in a tendency towards atomism in individuals, and a sense of nationalism needs to be instilled in order to preserve the community. He also claims that nationalism is the only way that rival opinions can exist harmoniously, as they are all united by the same national allegiance. Without it such concepts as Her Majesty's Loyal Opposition would be impossible, if not incoherent (Miller 1993, pp308-309).

There is a sense of question begging here though. Miller himself freely admits that his arguments are attempts to support a pre-existing intuition, rather than to justify that intuition using universal principles (ibid. p302). However, if I do not share the intuition, then I am never going to be convinced. If I see no harm in a larger nation fragmenting into smaller communities, or if I feel that rival factions competing for the heart of the nation do more harm than good, then Miller does nothing to change my mind.

More relevant for this essay though is that it cause no problems liberalism. While it is true that liberalism places no inherent value upon solidarity, neither does it denounce it. This is equally true for any value the nationalist chooses to advocate. In a liberal society, individuals are free to be as nationalist as they choose. If the instrumental value of nationalism is as compelling as the nationalists claim, then individuals will freely choose it, and a liberal state will let them.

I have examined a few of the possible conflicts between nationalism and liberalism, and have determined that none cause any great problems. In fact, generally both ideas can coexist quite peacefully, as they tend to address different questions. Nationalism deals with the instrumental value of having a shared identity with ones fellow nationals. Liberalism addresses the question of what to do when not everyone shares the same identity.

Therefore nationalism does not pose a problem for liberalism.

Bibliography

• MACINTYRE, ALASDAIR (1999) "In defence of the nation". In Matravers & Pike (Ed.), Debates in Contemporary Political Philosophy, 2003, London: Routledge, pp217-285.
• MILLER, DAVID (1993) "In defence of nationality". In Matravers & Pike (Ed.), Debates in Contemporary Political Philosophy, 2003, London: Routledge, pp217-285.
• MILLER, DAVID (1995) "On nationality". Oxford: Oxford University Press
• MILLER, DAVID (1998). "Nation and nationalism". In E. Craig (Ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge. Retrieved July 12, 2007, from http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/S039
• MISCEVIC, NENAD (2005). "Nationalism". In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved July 12, 2007, from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nationalism/
• SCRUTON, ROGER (1990) "In defence of the nation". In Matravers & Pike (Ed.), Debates in Contemporary Political Philosophy, 2003, London: Routledge, pp217-285.