To what extent are political leaders bound by a morality that is distinct from conventional morality, according to Machiavelli?
Is Machiavelli correct on that score?

Machiavelli is notorious for recommending that political leaders take actions that seem contrary to conventional morality. "Men must be either pampered or crushed" [chIII, p8]. "Whoever becomes the master of a city accustomed to freedom, and does not destroy it, may expect to be destroyed himself" [chV, p17]. Are they bound by conventional morality at all?

As C.A.J Coady says, when not involved in the business of state, political leaders are private individuals and are thus bound by the same moralities as all private individuals [Coady, p60]. He goes on to point out that it is common for people in certain roles to be exempt from certain moralities in order that they can fulfil their duties. The best example is that of a police officer who may - if circumstances dictate - assault a person, imprison them, or even kill them [Coady, p60]. Machiavelli's writings are certainly consistent with applying this idea to princes. Is he implying that political leaders are bound by a separate and distinct morality?

Isaiah Berlin's interpretation is that he does. He counters Croce (as summarised by Cochrane), who reads Machiavelli as saying "morality simply did not hold in political affairs" [Berlin, p47]. For one's private life, one must adhere to conventional morality, but politics is a realm distinct from conventional morality, so a political leader must therefore be above such things. i.e. a political leader must be amoral, and must simply do what he must without reference to the rights and wrong of the actions.

Berlin disputes this view. He argues that "If ethics is confined to, let us say, Stoic, or Christian or Kantian ... this might have been tenable" [Berlin, p47]. It suggests the view that a morality that is too far distinct from the Christian morality is no morality at all. This view is also implied by Warnock and others [Warburton, p18]. As Machiavelli is recommending political leaders follow a non-Christian morality, he must be recommending amorality.

Berlin instead suggests that Machiavelli is differentiating "between two incompatible ideals of life, and therefore two moralities" [Berlin, p43]. On one hand there is the 'conventional' Christian morality of meekness, forgiveness and toleration. On the other we have a classical-pagan morality of strength, vigour, fortitude and assertiveness. It is this latter morality that political leaders should be bound by.

Berlin's ideas are supported by explorations of the concept of virtu. When left untranslated, virtu is used to imply a kind of masculine prowess [AC1]. Machiavelli himself never explicitly defines it, although he does give examples of qualities he considers admirable ("grandeur, courage, sobriety, strength" [chXIX, p59]), but case studies by various commentators do suggest a meaning consistent with Berlin's alternate morality [Warburton, p6-7].

Maureen Ramsay has a different interpretation. She maintains that "the legacy of Machiavelli is the contrast not between the political and the moral but between consequentialist ethics and all other forms" [Ramsay, p39]. Rather than differentiating between moral and amoral, or two different moralities, he differentiates two types of morality. A deontological (rule/action based) approach such as Christian or Kantian would regard killing simply as an immoral act, and therefore wrong. A more consequentialist (outcome based) approach could accommodate killing in the name of a greater good. Machiavelli clearly recommends the latter for a political leader, although he wrote before such categorisations were made [Warburton, p10].

Few claim that Machiavelli denies the value of traditional virtues. He writes "it would be most laudable if a prince possessed all the qualities deemed to be good" [chXV, p50]. He does however explicitly warn that blind adherence to them is counter-productive for a political leader. "a man who wants to act virtuously in every way necessarily comes to grief" [chXV, p49-50]. So, what if anything is he advocating instead? Is he saying that a political leader should be amoral, or should follow Berlin's classical-pagan morality, or should simply take a more consequentialist view, and is he right to say it?

Strict Christian virtues are of no use to a Prince. Forgiveness, toleration and disregard for material goods would be quickly exploited by unscrupulous people, of which there are many, and the state would rapidly fall to ruin [chXV, p49-50; also Berlin, p43-44]. However, the same could be said of anyone, prince or peddler, who wishes to survive in a materialistic world. Nobody who desires a comfortable life or wishes to see criminals punished is following strict Christian ethics. Machiavelli is merely pointing out the impractical nature of Christian virtues. If one takes 'conventional' to mean 'Christian' then yes, Machiavelli is saying political leaders cannot be bound by it, and it seems reasonably clear that he is correct in this.

One could argue that Machiavelli is advocating the greatest Christian virtue of all: self-sacrifice. The immoralities that Machiavelli advocates are all in the name of peace and prosperity, yet a prince would be damning himself by following his advice. What could be nobler than sacrificing one's immortal soul for the greater good? However, salvation through damnation, i.e. gaining a place in heaven by sacrificing your place in heaven, is obviously contradictory.

Consider now a deontological morality. Any system of criminal justice involves punishment. At the very least, the threat of punishment must exist to act as a deterrent. In order for it to be a deterrent, it must be something that a person would not wish to have inflicted upon them. A punishment applied to an innocent would therefore necessarily be immoral. However, as deontological approaches look at the action, not the circumstances, the act would be equally immoral when applied to a guilty criminal. It therefore follows that no society with a criminal justice system can be based on a deontological morality. Machiavelli strongly recommends the swift and severe punishment of those who threaten the prince, so is obviously recommending a non-deontological approach. Again it seems reasonably clear that he is correct in this.

Berlin's classical-pagan morality is consequentialist in style. It places the society first. It values glory, valour, triumph over adversity. Is this what Machiavelli says political leaders should aspire to? According to Ramsay, "It would be absurd to attribute to Machiavelli a systematic ethical theory" [Ramsay, p38]. This may seem a stark comment, but it is a fair point. Machiavelli wrote The Prince as an instructional book. He makes a point of stating that his "intention is to say something that will prove of practical use to the inquirer" [chXV, p49], rather than describe idealised states in a utopian world.

Consider also that many of his comments were deliberate attacks on the writings of Cicero (e.g. his comments on the lion and the fox in chapter XVIII, p56). Cicero's writings were of the period that Berlin is describing, yet Machiavelli specifically contradicts them [AC1]. Additionally, while he draws many examples from classical antiquity, his ideas are always focussed on current situations. His highest praise is reserved not for Julius Caesar, or Pericles, or some other classical leader, but for Cesare Borgia who had died only a few years before. To demonstrate that he is advocating a Greco-Roman morality almost two thousand years old requires a stronger argument than that which Berlin supplies.

Does this mean political leaders should be bound by no morality at all? Are we left supporting the view of Croce and his followers? No.

Machiavelli deplores excessive cruelty. Cesare Borgia committed acts of violence, Agaothocles of Syracuse even more so, yet Machiavelli praises them both. Crucially though, his praise of Agaothocles is more reluctant, writing "At every stage of his career this man .. behaved like a criminal" [chVIII, p27]. He goes on to talk of cruelty used well and badly, even while asking "if it is permissible to talk in this way of what is evil" [chVIII, p30].

When Machiavelli recommends a seemingly immoral act, it is always in the context of a greater good. It is always in the quest to prevent a greater evil. Cutting someone's arm off is immoral, but not if it's gangrenous. Imprisoning a man against his will is immoral, but not if allowing him to remain free would result in him harming others.

So Machiavelli says a political leader should be bound by some sort of morality, but not a Christian (or any deontological) one, and Berlin's classical-pagan morality seems unlikely. So what then? In fact it is the same generic morality we all share to some degree.

In 2003, religious moralities have lost their dominance, but we all share some basic precepts, and these have not changed in 500 years. Regardless of background, we all agree that murder is wrong, as is rape, brutality, theft and wanton destruction. As the circumstances of the crimes get more specific, we may begin to disagree, but on this abstract, generic level, there is common ground. We need look no further than this generic 'folk morality' to understand Machiavelli.

Consider generosity, discussed in detail in chapter XVI and generally agreed to be virtuous. To be generous requires the liberal distribution of your resources. However, this makes you less able to defend yourself. If a situation did arise, one would be forced to tax your subjects excessively in order to raise the money for a defence, thus leaving them worse off than if you hadn't been generous in the first place.

He uses a similar argument in chapter XVII with cruelty - generally considered a vice. Cesare Borgia was cruel, but brought order and stability. The Florentines shunned cruelty and brought destruction upon Pistoia [chXVII, p53]. Machiavelli is not trying to explain a distinct morality. He is illustrating the bigger picture.

One might question the degree. To maintain order in a newly conquered state, is it really necessary to slaughter the family of the conquered ruler [chIII, p7]? Machiavelli thought it was, and moreover thought that not doing so would result in far greater turmoil and bloodshed in the longer term. In these modern times however, this may no longer be true. One must look at the circumstances and decide which is the greater evil: action or inaction? To murder a petty thief and all his associates would be a greater evil than allowing him to live. In the case of the head of an international terrorist organisation determined to destroy you, mass murder may be the lesser evil.

However, to judge between immoral action and moral inaction one does not need to look at any morality beyond the conventional. In fact, to do so would not make sense. To judge action with one morality, and inaction with another is a false comparison. Before we deem the action of a political leader as immoral under conventional moralities, we must first judge the consequences of inaction under the same morality.

Therefore, according to Machiavelli, political leaders are not bound by a morality that is distinct from conventional morality. Rather he is telling us to look beyond the apparent immoralities of the immediate action, and consider the greater evils that would result from inaction. Provided we consider each case on its own merits, and remember that nowadays it is rarely necessary to murder the leaders of a defeated political party, then we can conclude that he is correct on this score.

Bibliography

• Machiavelli N. 1999ed. The Prince; Penguin Classics
• Warburton N. et al, 2000. Reading Political Philosophy; Routledge
• Ramsay M. Machiavelli's Political Philosophy in The Prince, in Warburton 1999 (above)
• Berlin I. The Originality of Machiavelli, in Warburton (above)
• Coady CAJ, Dirty Hands, in Warburton (above)
• Audio Cassette 1 : Nigel Warburton interviews Quentin Skinner